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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers vulnerability reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from a more aggregated macro 
viewpoint.  We focus on risk related to agriculture, since vulnerability and agriculture are intimately 
linked in SSA due to the location of the poor, their dependence on agriculture and the inherent risks of an 
agricultural livelihood. We argue that agricultural growth is one of the most effective means for 
improving permanent incomes and reducing vulnerability. However, agriculture is not homogeneous, and 
the inherent risks vary across countries and regions. Therefore, we also discuss appropriate investment 
strategies and policy instruments for different sets of risks. 
Keywords:  Africa, agriculture, vulnerability, typology 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
The international community has set the ambitious goal of halving the proportion of poor by 2015. This 
increased focus on reducing poverty raises the question of who, exactly, are the poor? It is commonly 
assumed that there is a set of poor individuals, and that these individuals can be durably moved over a 
poverty line. However, the pool of poor is not fixed; the levels and composition of poverty change over 
time based on the incidence and effects of shocks on households. In fact, the levels of transitory poverty 
are often higher than those of chronic poverty (Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000). Therefore, development 
strategies should recognize the stochastic nature of poverty by incorporating vulnerability into their 
analysis. 
The literature on vulnerability (inter alia Farrington, 2005; Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000; 
2000/2001 World Development Report) has traditionally focused on the response of households or small 
communities to risks and shocks, or on how vulnerable groups are unable to participate in income-
generating opportunities. While this has broadened our understanding of the micro dynamics of 
vulnerability, we have not yet identified the most effective sets of instruments and strategies for reducing 
vulnerability at a more aggregate level. Moreover, by focusing on consumption variability, the micro 
vulnerability literature often tends to ignore the problems of the vulnerable, who require income growth in 
order to rise the above the poverty line (Chaudhuri, 2003).  
This paper contributes to the literature by considering vulnerability reduction in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) from a more aggregated macro viewpoint.1 We review vulnerability in SSA from the 
viewpoints of outcome, sources of shocks, and capacity. We then focus on risk related to agriculture, 
since vulnerability and agriculture are intimately linked in SSA due to the location of the poor, their 
dependence on agriculture and the inherent risks of an agricultural livelihood. We argue that agricultural 
growth is one of the most effective means for improving permanent incomes and reducing vulnerability. 
However, agriculture is not homogeneous, and the inherent risks vary across countries and regions. 
Therefore, we also discuss appropriate investment strategies and policy instruments for different sets of 
risks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literature on 
vulnerability and the patterns of vulnerability in Africa. Section 3 examines the role of agriculture in 
reducing vulnerability, while section 4 discusses investment options. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                      
1 In this paper, we use the term “macro” to refer to the aggregation of micro vulnerability, as opposed to macro events such 
as inflation, exchange rate movement, etc.     2
2.  A REVIEW OF VULNERABILITY IN SSA 
The meaning vulnerability differs across the various literatures (Alwang, Siegel and Jorgensen, 2001). In 
the development literature, it is generally used relative to poverty, and is defined as the ex ante risk that 
non-poor households will fall below the poverty line and poor households will remain poor (Tesliuc and 
Lindert, 2002 citing Holzmann, 2001). This is a dynamic process, in that it is affected by ex ante and ex 
post responses. In contrast, poverty is a more static concept, in that it is an ex post measure of welfare.  
Defining vulnerability relative to both current and potential future poverty is important from a 
policy perspective, insofar as poverty is a stochastic phenomenon (Chaudhuri, 2003). In other words, even 
if poverty rates stay the same, the poor of today may not be the poor of tomorrow, and conversely, the 
non-poor of today may be the poor of tomorrow. This can be seen in Murdoch’s (1994) distinction 
between chronic and transitory poverty. Looking at poverty as relating to a single group ignores this 
dynamism. In chronic poverty, both current consumption and permanent income are below the poverty 
line. Therefore, increases in current consumption will only temporarily lift the household out of poverty. 
In transitory poverty, however, only current consumption is below the poverty line, meaning that 
programs such as safety nets can be effective.  
Sustainable reductions in vulnerability, therefore, have two components: increasing permanent 
income through growth, and reducing the variability of current consumption. High levels of permanent 
income will increase consumption levels, thereby reducing the likelihood of a shock pushing current 
consumption below the poverty line. 
“Vulnerability” broadly reflects three components: (1) the sources of risk (shocks); (2) the 
responses of households and communities (which include the capacity to cope with shocks, as well as 
both ex ante strategies and ex post responses); and (3) the outcomes. Households face a variety of shocks 
and typically experience numerous shocks throughout the year. The ability of households to mitigate the 
effects of the shocks through either ex ante or ex post responses determines which shocks are important to 
each household. 
Outcomes 
An examination of outcome indicators at the national level shows that outcomes vary across countries. In 
the present work, we focus on hunger and undernourishment, since these are the most commonly 
observed outcomes of vulnerability in SSA.2 Specifically, we use three measures: the FAO’s estimate of 
                                                      
2 Relatively little data on the levels of poverty are available for SSA. In the 2006 WDI, only 17 countries have two 
observations of poverty between 1980 and 2005. None have three. This is further illustrated in Baulch and Hoddinott’s (2000) 
compilation of data on chronic and transitory poverty.   3
undernourishment, variability in cereal production and consumption, and the Global Hunger Index. The 
FAO’s measure of undernourishment essentially reflects the national availability of food after some 
adjustments for the distribution of food within each country.3 We use the national time series data of per 
capita cereal production and consumption data for the period of 1981-2004 to calculate the coefficient of 
variation (CV) as a measure of volatility in food supply and consumption. The Global Hunger Index is a 
composite measure of macro (undernourishment) and micro (child mortality and child malnutrition) 
indicators (Wiesmann, 2006).  
Table 1 presents the three indicators by country. Several findings are apparent from the table. 
First, while the average and median for undernourishment in SSA is approximately 30%, a large variation 
exists among the levels, with 10 countries falling below 15% and six countries exceeding 60%. Second, 
with the exception of Angola, the variability in cereal production in general is larger than that in cereal 
consumption. A good example may be seen in the case of Mauritius, where the CV in cereal production is 
the highest at 1.08, while its variability in consumption is the lowest at 0.03. Interestingly, most of the 
countries with high production variability are either islands or small economies. This suggests that 
production variability may not necessarily lead to consumption variability if a country has the capacity to 
smooth out production fluctuation-related consumption changes by importing food. 
Risk 
When talking about vulnerability, a key question is “vulnerable to what?” In general, shocks can be 
divided into two categories: idiosyncratic and covariate (systemic). The former affects individuals or 
households and includes such things as the illness or death of a family member. In contrast, systemic 
shocks affect groups of households or a given geographical area. Examples include drought, conflict, 
declining commodity prices, rising input prices, or the collapse of markets. In this paper, we focus on the 
covariate shocks, including both man-made and natural shocks. 
                                                      
3 The FAO’s estimate of undernourishment is primarily comprised of three parts. The daily per capita dietary energy supply 
(DES) represents the total energy available for human consumption per day per capita, and is calculated based on the country-
level food balance sheets of the FAO. The coefficient of variation (CV) in dietary energy intake reflects the distribution of dietary 
energy intake within each country. The CV is fixed and does not change across time. The minimum daily per capita dietary 
energy requirement represents the threshold below which a person is considered undernourished. Smith (1998), Naiken (2002), 
Haddad (2001), and Svedberg (2001) provide discussions about the FAO measure and its perceived flaws. 
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Table 1.  Undernourishment and variability in cereal production and consumption 
         Coefficient of variation       
Variable 
Undernourished 
(%)    
Cereal 
Production    
Cereal Food 
Consumption    
 Global 
Hunger 
Index    
Year(s) 2003  Rank  1981-2004  Rank  1981-2004  Rank  2003  Rank 
Angola   38  13  0.18  23  0.34  1  32.17  7 
Benin   14  34  0.15  31  0.07  26  17.77  34 
Botswana   30  22  .  .  .  .  18.57  32 
Burkina Faso   17  33  0.18  23  0.15  8  25.8  19 
Burundi   67  3  0.13  35  0.11  12  42.7  1 
Cameroon   25  26  0.13  35  0.08  19  19.52  28 
Cape Verde   .  .  0.71  2  0.06  32  .  . 
Central African Republic   45  9  0.22  20  0.07  26  28.43  14 
Chad   33  19  0.24  18  0.12  10  27.33  16 
Comoros   62  4  0.11  38  0.04  37  30.81  10 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  72  2  0.08  42  0.04  37  40.83  2 
Congo,  Rep.  34  17  0.63  3 0.21  2 .  . 
Cote d'Ivoire   14  34  0.1  41  0.07  26  18.13  33 
Equatorial Guinea   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Eritrea   73  1  .  .  .  .  40.37  3 
Ethiopia   46  8  0.16  29  0.08  19  36.7  4 
Gabon   5  43  0.18  23  0.17  5  9  39 
Gambia, The  27  24  0.18  23  0.08  19  18.83  30 
Ghana   12  36  0.22  20  0.18  4  14.87  36 
Guinea   24  28  0.13  35  0.04  37  21.73  23 
Guinea-Bissau   37  15  0.18  23  0.06  32  26.61  18 
Kenya   31  21  0.21  22  0.08  19  21.73  23 
Lesotho   12  36  0.29  15  0.07  26  12.8  38 
Liberia   49  6  0.55  5  0.21  2  32  8 
Madagascar   38  13  0.11  38  0.1  15  29.92  12 
Malawi   34  17  0.23  19  0.06  32  25.4  21 
Mali   28  23  0.14  33  0.09  16  28.07  15 
Mauritania   10  39  0.38  8  0.09  16  20.03  27 
Mauritius   6  42  1.08  1  0.03  42  3.8  42 
Mayotte   .  .  .  .  .  .  6.42  41 
Mozambique   45  9  0.36  10  0.17  5  28.83  13 
Namibia   23  29  0.3  14  0.04  37  17.5  35 
Niger   32  20  0.16  29  0.04  37  33.43  6 
Nigeria   9  40  0.17  28  0.11  12  19.17  29 
Rwanda   36  16  0.27  17  0.16  7  27.2  17 
Sao Tome and Principe   12  36  0.58  4  0.12  10  .  . 
Senegal   23  29  0.28  16  0.08  19  20.13  26 
Seychelles   9  40  .  .  0.06  32  .  . 
Sierra Leone   50  5  0.32  12  0.07  26  35.2  5 
Somalia   .  .  .  .  .  .  7.66  40 
South Africa   .  .  0.32  12  0.02  43  25.67  20 
Sudan   27  .  0.34  11  0.08  19  14.87  36 
Swaziland   19  31  0.42  7  0.13  9  29.97  11 
Tanzania   44  12  0.15  31  0.05  36  21.1  25 
Togo   25  26  0.14  33  0.07  26  2.47  43 
Uganda   19  31  0.11  38  0.11  12  18.63  31 
Zambia   47  7  0.38  8  0.08  19  31.77  9 
Zimbabwe   45  9  0.48  6  0.09  16  23.2  22 
Note: Data for the first three indicators are drawn from FAOSTAT. The coefficient of variation was calculated by the authors. 
The last column is from “A Global Hunger Index, Measurement Concept, Ranking of Countries, and Trends” by Doris 
Wiesmann, FCND Discussion Paper 212 (2006, IFPRI).   5
Civil wars and, more broadly, instability have plagued SSA since the wave of independence 
began in the 1960s. For instance, Miguel et al. (2004) report that during the 1980s and 1990s, civil 
conflict existed in 29 of the 43 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. While the severity of conflicts has 
arguably declined in recent years with the end of long-standing conflicts in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique 
and Sierra Leone, conflict remains an important factor, in part because it has lasting effects on the civil 
population and current stocks of infrastructure, and may also influence potential future investment. 
Recently, the FAO identified decreasing conflict as one of the five major common factors important to 
reducing food insecurity.4 To measure this, we use the number of years during which a given country 
endured conflict, which is defined at least 1,000 deaths due to politically-motivated violence during the 
year. These data are drawn from the armed conflict database available through the Centre for the Study of 
Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute. Table 2 presents the number of years with a 
conflict (as defined above) for different countries over different periods. Among the 47 countries 
surveyed, 18 experienced conflict during the period of 1970-2004.5 When comparing Table 1 and Table 
2, it becomes obvious that the countries subject to high food insecurity and consumption variability are 
also war-stricken countries. It is also apparent that conflict-bearing countries generally perform worse in 
the major outcome variables of vulnerability compared to non-conflict countries. Thus, it is important to 
consider the role of conflict when addressing vulnerability in SSA.  
Tropical diseases have long been identified as a key constraint to economic growth (inter alia 
Gallup et al., 1999; Murray and Lopez, 1996). Malaria has historically been an impediment to 
development in the tropics. More recently, HIV/AIDS has dramatically increased, leading to potentially 
serious results in terms of increased mortality and foregone economic growth. Gillespie and Kadiyala 
(2005) provide an overview of the links between HIV/AIDS and food and nutritional security. HIV/AIDS 
has been shown to affect cropping patterns and crop value across a variety of Sub-Saharan African 
countries (inter alia Donovan et al., 2003; Kwarmba, 1997; Muwanga, 2002; Yamano and Jayne, 2004;), 
the availability of labor (Shah et al., 2001), and the sale of livestock following the death of family 
members (Engh et al., 2000; and Haslwimmer, 1994). 
                                                      
4 Based upon a study of 13 countries, the FAO (2001-CL 120
th session) identified the following factors: (a) peace and social 
stability; (b) strong economic growth; (c) primacy of policy support; (d) social safety nets for the poor; and (e) access to food 
imports including food aid. 
5 The apparent difference between Table 2 and the number of conflicts reported by Miguel et al. (2004) results from the use 
of different data sets and definitions. Regardless of the data, a large percentage of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have suffered 
from conflict.    6
Table 2.  Number of years with conflicts killing at least 1,000 
   1970-2004  1970-1980  1981-2004 
Angola 24  6  18 
Benin 0  0  0 
Botswana 0  0  0 
Burkina Faso  0  0  0 
Burundi 4  0  4 
Cameroon 0  0  0 
Cape Verde  0  0  0 
Central African Republic  0  0  0 
Chad 20  11  9 
Comoros 0  0  0 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  4  0  4 
Congo, Rep.  2  0  2 
Cote d'Ivoire  0  0  0 
Equatorial Guinea  0  0  0 
Eritrea 3  0  3 
Ethiopia 21  7  14 
Gabon 0  0  0 
Gambia, The  0  0  0 
Ghana 0  0  0 
Guinea 0  0  0 
Guinea-Bissau 1  0  1 
Kenya 0  0  0 
Lesotho 0  0  0 
Liberia 3  0  3 
Madagascar 0  0  0 
Malawi 0  0  0 
Mali 0  0  0 
Mauritania 0  0  0 
Mauritius 0  0  0 
Mayotte 23  3  20 
Mozambique 12  0  12 
Namibia 0  0  0 
Niger 0  0  0 
Nigeria 1  1  0 
Rwanda 4  0  4 
Sao Tome and Principe  0  0  0 
Senegal 0  0  0 
Seychelles 0  0  0 
Sierra Leone  2  0  2 
Somalia 4  0  4 
South Africa  7  1  6 
Sudan 0  0  0 
Swaziland 0  0  0 
Tanzania 0  0  0 
Togo 0  0  0 
Uganda 12  1  11 
Zambia 0  0  0 
Zimbabwe 4  4  0 
      
Source: Data are drawn from the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute.   7
Table 3 lists the incidence rates of malaria for the most recent year and the adult HIV/AIDS 
levels.6 We choose these indicators as measures of tropical diseases since they are widely available, and 
the “pattern for malaria is common to a range of infectious diseases” (p. 22, Gallup et al., 1999). In 
addition to being severe idiosyncratic shocks, these two diseases may also have systemic effects through 
such pathways as labor markets. As can be seen in the table, malaria is primarily concentrated in tropical 
areas, with the highest levels seen in Sao Tome, Principe and Uganda.7 HIV/AIDS is primarily 
concentrated in South and East Africa. In particular, countries with high levels of HIV/AIDS tend to rank 
worse on the Global Hunger Index. Because health itself is an important outcome variable, the risk 
associated with malaria and HIV/AIDS cannot be understated when discussing malnourishment, even 
though these factors may not directly relate to malnutrition. 
In this paper, we focus on covariate agricultural risk due to the importance of agriculture with 
respect to vulnerability in SSA, and the natural role of government policy in dealing with covariate risk. 
Climate change is expected to increase this agricultural risk in many areas by altering the levels and 
variance of rainfall (Table 3) and the length of the growing season (Table 5). Among the many 
biophysical factors that affect agricultural choices and performance, moisture availability is key. 
As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, there is a strong spatial component to the levels and variability 
of rainfall in Africa. The majority of the high rainfall areas are found in the central and western areas of 
SSA (from Gabon to Congo), and some areas in eastern Africa. The variability of rainfall in these areas is 
relatively low. Total rainfall is roughly equal across the remainder of SSA (although it is somewhat 
higher in the southeast); however rainfall variability differs across these regions, with Madagascar, 
Angola and Somalia considered lower rainfall regions, while countries bordering the Sahara tend to show 
high levels of rainfall variability.  
These general impressions are reflected in Table 4, which shows the estimated share of rural 
population by the level and variability of annual rainfall in SSA. Interestingly, although Rwanda ranks in 
the bottom third in terms of the prevalence of undernourishment and variability in cereal consumption, the 
share of rural population affected by low rainfall and high variability is only 1%. By and large, Rwanda 
has good agricultural production conditions with little exposure to natural shocks. Therefore, it is likely 
that the vulnerability in Rwanda mainly comes from man-made shocks, such as civil conflict or structural 
problems (e.g. land scarcity and low crop yields). This example highlights the importance of examining 
the sources of vulnerability.  
                                                      
6 We calculate the incidence by dividing the total reported cases by the population for the year. 
7 The surprisingly high levels in Uganda are driven by increasing treatment failures due to drug resistance and the abolition 
of user fees in the public sector (CDC, 2004).     8
Table 3.  Levels of tropical disease 
         Country Rank              Country Rank 






















Angola  9.6%  3.7%  20  22                   
Benin 10.5%  1.8%  15  33      Liberia  28.8%  5.9%  4  16 
Botswana 1.3%  24.1%  37  2      Madagascar  12.0%  0.5%  13  44 
Burkina  Faso  12.1%  2.0%  12  32     Malawi  23.6% 14.1%  7  9 
Burundi 26.5%  3.3%  6  24      Mali  6.4%  1.7%  26  34 
Cameroon  4.7%  5.4%  29 17      Mauritania  6.0%  0.7%  27 42 
Cape Verde  0.0%  .  44  .     Mauritius  0.0%  0.6%  44  43 
Central African 
Republic  2.4%  10.7%  33  10     Mozambique  26.7% 16.1%  5  8 
Chad  4.5%  3.5%  30  23     Namibia  22.4% 19.6%  8  5 
Comoros  0.7%  0.0%  39 45      Niger  5.4%  1.1%  28 39 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  8.1%  3.2%  23  25     Nigeria  2.1%  3.9%  35  20 
Congo, Rep.  0.5%  5.3%  41  18     Rwanda  9.8%  3.1%  18  27 
Cote d'Ivoire  2.3%  7.1%  34  12    
Sao Tome and 
Principe 42.3%  .  2  . 
Djibouti  0.7%  3.1%  39 27      Senegal  10.8%  0.9%  14 40 
Equatorial Guinea  3.1%  3.2%  32  25     Sierra Leone  9.4%  1.6%  21  35 
Eritrea  1.8%  2.4%  36 29      Somalia  0.3%  0.9%  43 40 
Ethiopia 0.8%  4.4%  38  19      South  Africa  0.0%  18.8%  44  6 
Gabon  6.6%  7.9%  25 11      Sudan  8.8%  1.6%  22 35 
Gambia, The  10.0%  2.4%  17  29     Swaziland  3.3%  33.4%  31  1 
Ghana 16.7%  2.3%  10  31      Tanzania  29.0%  6.7%  3  13 
Guinea  10.5%  1.5%  15 38      Togo  7.8%  6.5%  24 14 
Guinea-Bissau  13.5%  3.8%  11  21     Uganda  45.9% 17.0%  1  7 
Kenya  0.4%  6.1%  42  15     Zambia  18.4% 20.1%  9  4 
Lesotho 0.0%  23.2%  44  3      Zimbabwe  9.8%  1.6%  18  35 
*The Malaria information is based on the most recent data from the WHO Global Health Atlas, with the exception of that from Lesotho, which is drawn from the 2003 Millennium 
Indicators Database. Percent values are calculated by dividing the total number of reported cases by the total population, as given in the WDI. 
**The HIV data are from the UNAIDS 2006 Global Report and are for Adults 15+ in the year 2003. The data for Liberia and Ethiopia were drawn from the WDI and are for adults 
(15-49) in 2003.   9
Table 4.  Percentage of rural population affected by rainfall risk 
Country Rainfall*  Rank      Country  Rainfall*  Rank 
Angola  18.7%  26             
Benin 13.9%  27      Liberia  0.0%  38 
Botswana 100.0%  1      Madagascar  100.0%  1 
Burkina Faso  21.4%  24     Malawi  50.3%  18 
Burundi 2.7%  31      Mali  50.2%  19 
Cameroon 4.7%  30      Mauritania  100.0%  1 
Central African Republic  0.2%  37     Mozambique  40.7%  20 
Chad 33.9%  22      Namibia  100.0%  1 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.5%  35     Niger  89.8%  9 
Congo, Rep.  0.0%  38     Nigeria  20.9%  25 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.0%  38     Rwanda  0.7%  33 
Djibouti 100.0%  1      Senegal  82.8%  12 
Equatorial Guinea  0.0%  38     Sierra Leone  0.0%  38 
Eritrea 100.0%  1      Somalia  100.0%  1 
Ethiopia  34.9%  21     South Africa  80.0%  13 
Gabon 2.5%  32      Sudan  80.0%  13 
Gambia, The  88.5%  10     Swaziland  88.0%  11 
Ghana 9.1%  28      Tanzania  52.4%  17 
Guinea 0.0%  38      Togo  6.2%  29 
Guinea-Bissau 0.3%  36      Uganda  0.7%  33 
Kenya 32.8%  23      Zambia  55.9%  16 
Lesotho 66.9%  15      Zimbabwe  94.4%  8 
*Rainfall risk refers to areas with 1000 mm or less average annual rainfall and a coefficient of variation of 18 or higher. The 
rainfall data are drawn from the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit (Mitchell et al. 2003). These data are 
interpolated globally from weather station records at a 0.5 decimal degree resolution for the period 1951-2005.  
Expected changes in climate are likely to exacerbate moisture-related agricultural risk by altering 
the levels and variance of rainfall (Table 3) and the length of the growing season (Table 5). However, the 
geographical distribution of this vulnerability to climate change is not uniform. Figure 3 shows the 
expected change in length of growing period between the years 2000 and 2030. The areas where the 
growth period is expected to decrease by more than two weeks over this time are primarily concentrated 
in southern and central Africa (particularly Angola), although the coincidence with rural population 
distributions highlights several countries in other sub-regions where this will become an issue. As a 
general observation, areas that are already characterized by relatively short growing periods are most 
often predicted to experience significant reductions over the next several decades. We include these data 
to highlight climate change as an important issue in the strategic discussions of agricultural risk. 
However, the nature of climate predictions is speculative (Govindasamy et al., 2003) and it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to quantify the likelihood of these outcomes or their spatial accuracy.  Thus, while we 
include these data to round out our discussion, we do not use them as quantitative inputs in our typology. 
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Table 5.  Length of growing season and arable land per capita 








(hectares)**  Land  Composite 1 
(Land*LGP) 
Composite 2 











Angola  182.6  0.22  16  12  16                      
Benin  179.3  0.34  19 7  7     Liberia 277.7  0.12  2  17  30 
Botswana  30.6 0.21  42 40  39     Madagascar  183.4  0.17  15  22  24 
Burkina  Faso  95.9 0.39  30 15  11     Malawi  152.3  0.20  22  24  21 
Burundi  223.7  0.14  10 21  26     Mali  88.6 0.37  32  19  12 
Cameroon  209.3  0.38  13 3  5     Mauritania  31.2  0.17  41  42  41 
Central African 
Republic  216.2  0.49  11 1  1     Mozambique  128.6  0.23  26  25  19 
Chad  97.0 0.39  29 14  10     Namibia 35.4 0.41  40  38  22 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  258.0  0.12  4  23  31     Niger  40.3  1.11  38  9  2 
Congo, Rep.  252.9  0.13  5  18  28     Nigeria  172.1  0.24  20  11  13 
Cote d'Ivoire  225.2  0.19  8  10  17     Rwanda  240.9  0.14  6  16  25 
Djibouti  30.0 0.00  43 43  43     Senegal  88.6 0.22  32  33  27 
Equatorial Guinea  296.2  0.27  1  2  6     Sierra Leone  231.2  0.11  7  29  35 
Eritrea  50.6 0.14  37 39  40     Somalia  38.5 0.14  39  41  42 
Ethiopia  136.9  0.16  25 32  33     South  Africa  92.4 0.32  31  26  14 
Gabon 261.2  0.24  3  6  9      Sudan  65.9  0.49  36  20  8 
Gambia,  The  85.1 0.22  34 35  29     Swaziland  117.4  0.16  27  34  34 
Ghana 224.9  0.20  9  8  15      Tanzania  165.2  0.11  21  36  38 
Guinea  192.2  0.12  14 31  36     Togo  180.8  0.43  18  4  3 
Guinea-Bissau  145.7  0.20  23 27  23     Uganda 210.8  0.19  12  13  18 
Kenya  181.9  0.14  17 28  32     Zambia  137.0  0.47  24  5  4 
Lesotho  81.9 0.18  35 37  37     Zimbabwe  100.0  0.25  28  30  20 
* LGP estimates are based upon on 1-km
2 estimates of the length of growing period in days for 2000 (Thornton, unpublished).  LGP, which is defined as the number of days in a year with 
conditions suitable for plant growth, is calculated on the basis of the number of days with minimum temperatures greater than 5 degrees Celsius during which precipitation exceeds evapo-
transpiration by 50%, taking into account the water holding capacity of the predominant soil type. The country numbers are generated using a rural population weighted by the average of 
the different growing periods. The values for the growing periods are the medians of the following categories: 0-60, 61-120, 121-180, 181-240, 241-300 and 301-365 days. 
** 2003 data from the WDI.      11
Figure 1.  Precipitation 
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Figure 2.  Precipitation variability 
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Figure 3. Estimated change in length of growing period 
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Responses (capacity) 
The third dimension of vulnerability is related to the responses of households and communities to both 
risks (ex ante strategies) and the realization of risks, i.e. shocks (ex poste responses). Informal risk 
mechanisms are generally more successful with dealing with idiosyncratic risk. Households are typically 
able to mitigate the effects of small and frequent shocks, but tend to have difficultly insuring against 
large, infrequent shocks that have lasting effects (e.g. disability or chronic illness). However, these 
informal mechanisms are not completely effective; they are often costly and may result in the household 
forgoing income-generating opportunities (Murdoch, 2004).  
By and large, both informal and formal copying strategies at the micro level fail to adequately 
address covariate shocks (Holzmann, 2001). In contrast, government investment and policies are thought 
to effectively address covariate shocks. For instance, commodity price stabilization programs can reduce 
price risk, while food imports and food aid are widely used in the event of war or natural disasters. 
Governments, however, often have difficultly dealing with idiosyncratic shocks, for a variety of reasons 
including asymmetric and imperfect information, as well as high transaction costs (Murdoch, 2004).  
More broadly, countries have different abilities to respond to large covariate shocks. Table 6 
shows two aggregate proxies for the ability of countries to respond, namely the share of the rural 
population and the food imports as a percentage of exported goods and services. These are valid proxies 
because the sources of shocks and coping strategies in an urbanized economy differ greatly from those in 
an agrarian economy. More urbanized economies tend to have additional resources for importing food 
when necessary, and the non-farm sector is generally more immune to weather shocks than the farming 
sector. When facing food shortages, countries have the option of importing food. The ability to import 
food relies on hard currency generated from exports. Therefore, we also examine the burden of total food 
bill (Díaz-Bonilla, Thomas, and Robinson, 2002). During the period of 1993-2004, Rwanda spent 42% of 
its export revenue on food imports, whereas Nigeria, which has rich oil resources, spent only 0.11% of its 
export revenue on food over the same period.  
In the absence of trade, food availability is largely determined by the land-population ratio and 
other natural conditions (e.g. the length of the growing season). A simple examination of arable land per 
capita can be misleading, as it does not account for the quality of the land or the length of the growing 
season. For instance, Niger and Sudan have two of the three highest amounts of arable land per capita in 
SSA. However, this is largely the result of poor agro-ecological conditions, which result in low 
population densities and large farm sizes. However, examination of a composite index such as the product 
of the amount of effective land per capita and the length of the growth period (or its square), it is apparent 
that countries like Mali and Niger are particularly vulnerable due to their lack of domestic capacity and 
low overall trade.   15
Table 6.  Proxies for country coping capacity 
Country  Rural Population (%)*  Ratio of food imports to  
exports of goods and services** 
Angola   63.5  . 
Benin   54.7  0.45 
Botswana   48.0  0.09 
Burkina Faso   81.8  0.42 
Burundi   89.7  0.38 
Cameroon   47.8  0.1 
Cape Verde   43.3  0.61 
Central African Republic   56.8  0.2 
Chad   74.6  0.28 
Comoros   64.3  0.62 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  67.7  . 
Congo, Rep.  46.0  0.1 
Cote d'Ivoire   54.6  0.12 
Equatorial Guinea   51.0  . 
Eritrea   79.6  . 
Ethiopia   84.1  0.18 
Gabon   15.6  0.07 
Gambia, The  73.8  0.42 
Ghana   54.2  0.16 
Guinea   64.3  0.21 
Guinea-Bissau   65.2  1.96 
Kenya   59.5  0.14 
Lesotho   81.9  . 
Liberia   52.7  . 
Madagascar   73.2  0.12 
Malawi   83.3  0.2 
Mali   67.0  0.23 
Mauritania   37.0  0.23 
Mauritius   56.5  0.13 
Mayotte   .  . 
Mozambique   63.2  0.27 
Namibia   67.0  0.14 
Niger   77.3  0.46 
Nigeria   52.5  0.11 
Rwanda   79.9  0.42 
Sao Tome and Principe   62.1  . 
Senegal   49.7  0.31 
Seychelles   49.9  0.21 
Sierra Leone   60.5  0.39 
Somalia   64.6  . 
South Africa   42.6  0.05 
Sudan   60.2  0.29 
Swaziland   76.3  0.18 
Tanzania   63.5  0.18 
Togo   64.3  0.25 
Uganda   87.7  0.28 
Zambia   63.8  0.12 
Zimbabwe 64.6  0.11 
*2005 rural population data from the WDI 
** Authors' calculation based on 1995-2004 data from the WDI   16
Moreover, any judgment regarding the ability of households and governments to respond 
effectively presupposes a certain level of stability. Conflicts not only directly cause hunger and poverty, 
but also impede the ability of governments and international relief organizations to respond effectively. 
Beyond its immediate impact, conflict may also therefore result in longer-term effects such as the 
destruction of infrastructure and decreased agricultural productivity (Fulginiti, Perrin and Yu, 2004). 
These effects are particularly severe and long-lasting when food is used as a weapon (i.e. when food 
systems are intentionally destroyed as part of the conflict) (Macrae and Zwi, 1993; Messer, 1990). In this 
situation, the ability of government to directly intervene post-conflict may be limited to food aid until the 
necessary infrastructure and food systems are rebuilt.  17
3.  GROWTH AND VULNERABILITY REDUCTION: THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE 
As the previous section illustrates, aggregate vulnerability varies greatly across countries. In large part, 
agriculture is the source of much of the risk, and is arguably central to reducing vulnerability and poverty.   
Agriculture and vulnerability are linked in SSA due to the location of the poor and their 
dependence on the agricultural sector. Maxwell (2001) estimates that roughly 70% of the workforce in 
Africa is at least partially engaged in agriculture. Farming is largely a risk business because weather is 
highly variable and income streams are lumpy. Therefore, agricultural production variability has a 
pronounced impact on farmers’ incomes. Slight changes in temperature or rainfall can dramatically 
change yields. Moreover, agricultural income is generally obtained in a lump sum during the harvest and 
post-harvest period, and this income must be spread throughout the year. However, the general lack of 
financial development in SSA makes it difficult for households to smooth their income throughout the 
year. In addition, risks associated with storage also mean that agriculture is inherently risky. 
The rural non-farm sector, which corresponds to roughly 40-60 percent of rural income (Davis, 
2003), is also closely tied to rural livelihoods. Moreover, diversification has long been recognized as an 
important strategy for reducing risk and vulnerability (Ellis and Freeman, 2004). In particular, non-farm 
income diversification leads to both higher incomes and an increased ability to cope with shocks such as 
droughts. Unsurprisingly, therefore, a number of studies have found that non-farm income and household 
welfare indicators are positively related in rural Sub-Saharan Africa (Barrett et al., 2001).  
However, there are a number of reasons to believe that the rural non-farm sector may not be a 
sufficient avenue for reducing vulnerability and poverty. Since the rural non-farm sector is usually less 
vulnerable to weather shocks, a vibrant rural non-farm sector would help to diversify agricultural risks. 
However, due to the aggregate size of the agricultural sector, risks in agricultural production would still 
dominate. In these countries, variability in agricultural production may affect other sectors and, more 
broadly, affect the macro economy. In particular, industries that depend upon the agricultural sector, such 
as food processing and textiles, are often adversely affected by volatility in the agricultural supply. 
Moreover, large decreases in agricultural production (e.g. due to drought) can deteriorate the balance of 
payments, increasing the amount of government funds being spent on food aid and relief as opposed to 
other equally important public goods and services. Certainly, as a given economy develops, the share of 
agriculture in the overall economy declines and people are likely to become less vulnerable to weather 
shocks. However, this is not yet the case in SSA. 
Within the agricultural sector, production diversification is often used as a coping strategy for 
reducing vulnerability. Due to a general lack of data, we cannot address this point directly in the present 
paper. To some extent, however, the agricultural potential variables examined herein, such as rainfall and   18
the length of growth period, capture the ability of diversification. Higher rainfall and a longer growth 
period will allow a broader range of strategies compared to other end of the spectrum, such as the 
conditions experienced by pastoral nomads in marginal areas. In support of this, Jansen, Siegel and 
Pichón (2005) show that higher rainfall is linked with diversification in Honduras.   
By targeting rural and vulnerable populations, growth in agriculture will play a large role in 
reducing vulnerability in both the short and long terms. Such growth will increase permanent incomes and 
improve the capacity of households to deal with shocks. Moreover, depending how the growth is 
stimulated and supported by policies and investments, it may also reduce some of the underlying risk in 
agriculture.  
As previously noted, poverty can be divided into chronic and transitory poverty. Growth is the 
major instrument for achieving sustainable reductions in the vulnerability of production and the 
variability of current consumption. Agricultural growth may be the most appropriate way to achieve both 
of these goals for several reasons. 
Firstly, in the short term, agricultural growth reduces vulnerability by increasing farmers’ 
incomes, providing employment for agricultural labor, increasing the wages of agricultural labor, and 
lowering food prices for both the urban and rural poor (Chaudhuri, 2003; Timmer, 1988). Apart from net 
food consumers, households involved in agriculture, especially those who are linked to markets, will be 
the primary beneficiaries. This increased income will help vulnerable households build their assets, 
thereby increasing their ability to generate income and resist shocks.  
Secondly, in the medium term, agricultural growth has important indirect effects through growth 
linkages that stimulate the non-agricultural sector (Stern, 1996; Timmer, 1988). At lower levels of 
development, the backward linkages from agriculture are especially strong (Vogel, 1994). Agricultural 
productivity is also positively linked with non-farm activity in Africa (Barrett et al., 2001).  
Thirdly, as a sector, agriculture is important for both overall growth and export earnings. It lies at 
the center of the rural economy and is often integral to national growth in countries without mineral 
resources (WFP, 2002). For instance, in 1997/1998, the cotton sector in Mali represented close to half of 
the country’s export revenue, and 6 and 9 percent of the total tax revenue and GDP, respectively (IMF, 
2002). Thus, the sector directly affected the livelihoods of roughly a third of the population. 
Agricultural Growth Typology 
While agricultural growth is important to reducing vulnerability and supporting the overall growth 
process, its role will vary across countries based upon the overall economic structure and potential for 
agriculture (Diao et al. 2006). Table 7 shows the countries in SSA grouped based upon these two 
considerations.   19
Table 7.  A typology of agricultural risk and the role of agriculture in growth 
      Resource-Rich Non  Resource-Rich 






Uganda  Low 







Cameroon  Ghana  Burundi 
Chad  Guinea Bissau  Central African Republic 
Congo Dem Rep  Kenya Ethiopia 
Gabon Madagascar  Malawi 
Guinea Mauritania  Mali 
Liberia Senegal  Niger 
Mauritania Somalia  Swaziland 
Namibia South  Africa  Zimbabwe 
Sao Tome and Principe  Tanzania   
Sierra Leone     
Sudan    
Medium 
  














  Gambia   
Note: The county names in bold are included in the USAID Presidential “Initiative to End Hunger in Africa.” Several countries 
are omitted due to a lack of rainfall data. A country is defined as having a low agricultural risk if the rainfall risk is below the 
SSA sample median and the length of growth period is above the median. If a country scores higher than the median of rainfall 
risk in the sample and lower than the median value of the length of growth period, it is classified as high agricultural risk. The 
remaining countries are in the medium category. 
The use of geography and resource endowment to group SSA countries is well established 
(UNIDO, 2004; Collier and O’Connell, forthcoming). In combination, these two factors shape the overall 
structure of the economy and its opportunities for future economic growth. For instance, resource-rich 
countries often have over-valued exchange rates due to the export of natural resources, thereby creating 
unfavorable terms of trade for the agricultural sector. Likewise, land-locked resource-poor countries are 
more dependent on their neighbors for trade and infrastructure compared to coastal economies.  
Our classification of resource-rich versus non-rich countries draws on the work of Diao et al. 
(2006), UNIDO (2004), and Collier and O’Connell (forthcoming). The classifications largely overlap, 
with 14 resource-rich countries commonly identified among the three papers. However, some differences 
exist between these studies.8 The UNIDO list of resource-rich countries contains only the overlapping 
                                                      
8 The following countries are considered resource-rich in all three prior papers as well as the present work: Angola, 
Botswana, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Sierra Leone, and Zambia.   20
countries, and the basis of the classification is unclear.9 While based on the UNIDO (2004) report, Diao 
et al. (2006) includes Sudan on the list of resource-rich countries without explanation. The Collier and 
O’Connell classification (forthcoming) relies on the natural rents and the share of primary commodity 
exports for classification,10 and includes the common 14 countries as well as Liberia and Swaziland 
under the category of ‘resource-rich. 
Our list of resource-rich countries includes the 14 common rich countries along with Chad, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sudan.11 The addition of these countries reflects the actual 
and likely effects of natural resources. Chad and Sudan both have significant oil potential. In particular, 
The International Energy Outlook 2007 from the United States Government notes that Sudan has the 
potential to exceed 700,000 barrels per day by 2010. We follow Collier and O’Connell by including 
Liberia based on their diamond and other natural resources. The April 2007 repeal of the ban on the 
export of Liberian diamonds will increase their impact on the economy. Likewise, Mittal recently signed 
a contract for the export of iron ore. Similarly, we include the Democratic Republic of Congo based on its 
under-exploited natural resources. Arguably, these helped fuel and cause conflicts in the eastern regions 
of the country. The non-inclusion of Swaziland is debatable, since according to the IMF (2006), sugar 
accounts for 12 percent of exports from this country. However, the report also notes that the preferential 
sugar prices the country enjoys from the EU will potentially decline by 36 percent over a 4-year window 
beginning in 2007. Due to this uncertainty, we follow the other reports and do not include Swaziland as a 
resource-rich country.  
Agricultural potential is measured using rainfall risk data and the length of the growth period 
faced by the rural population. A country is defined as having a low agricultural risk if the rainfall risk is 
below the SSA sample median and the length of the growth period is above the median.12 If a country 
scores higher than the median of the rainfall risk variable and lower than the median value of the length of 
growth period, it is classified as high agricultural risk. The remaining countries are in the medium-risk 
category.  
In resource-rich economies, although the bulk of GDP is derived from the natural resource, the 
resource itself is rarely the leading source of employment, and large portions of the population and 
economy may be relatively unconnected to the natural resource. This is the so-called “enclave” economy. 
Despite the lack of linkages with other sectors, the government can use the receipts from the natural 
                                                      
9 The table states that it is based on Collier, 2004, which is listed in the bibliography as “Collier, P. 2004. Background paper 
for this report. Processed” (p. 25). 
10 In footnote two, they provide a more complete explanation. Essentially, countries had to meet the following criteria: 
“current rents from energy, minerals and forests exceed 5% of GNI, a forward moving average of these rents exceeds 10% of 
GNI, the share of primary commodities in exports exceeds 20% for at least a 5-year period following this initial year” (p. 6). 
11 However, due to data constraints not every country is included in Table 7.  
12For the length of growth period variable, we use the second composite indicator listed in Table 5.   21
resource to spread the benefits to rural populations through public sector investment. However, with the 
exception of Botswana, natural resources have generally been linked with bad governance and instability 
in these countries. In this context, agricultural growth may act as an important secondary engine of 
growth, since (unlike the resource industries) it has strong linkages to the poor and the broad economy. 
Even when agricultural risk is high, agriculture may still play an important role in providing livelihoods 
for the rural poor.  
In resource-poor risk countries, especially those that are land-locked, agriculture can play a 
crucial role as a primary engine of growth. It also contributes to the development of the manufacturing 
sector, particularly in coastal countries, by freeing up labor and capital, reducing workers’ food costs, and 
supplying some raw materials. In land-locked countries, agriculture may provide the only engine of 
growth, due to larger distances to major markets and comparably lower levels of transportation 
infrastructure in the region. Since SSA is a net cereal and staple crop-importing region, there may be 
agricultural growth options for land-locked countries with high agricultural risk, where the sector may 
provide subsistence for the poor rural farmers until the economy is able to diversify and farmers are able 
to move out of agriculture.   22
4.  INVESTMENT OPTIONS 
In the above discussion, we argue that agricultural growth is still one of the most effective instruments for 
improving permanent income and reducing vulnerability. While safety nets are important (under certain 
conditions) to allow households to participate in growth, they are typically not sufficient to generate broad 
growth. Rather, they provide an instrument to link households or regions with opportunities. 
However, agriculture is not homogeneous and the risks faced by countries and regions vary. We 
therefore discuss investments in the context of the typology outlined above. Moreover, as Farrington 
(2005) notes, different segments of the rural population face different risks and constraints to participating 
in agricultural growth. Therefore, investments and policy responses should be targeted accordingly.  
Rural Infrastructure and Access to Markets 
While rural infrastructure and access to markets are important for all countries, they may be 
especially important for countries that rely on agriculture (typically countries in boxes 3, 6 and 9 in Table 
7), due to their lack of natural resources or abilities to export. Improved infrastructure may reduce 
transactions costs, link the labor and product markets, and promote division of labor (Bigsten and 
Shimeles, 2004; Dercon, 2001). Moreover, the construction of infrastructure can reduce vulnerability by 
providing income sources for households in the off-season (Peters, 1996). Lower transaction costs allow 
more people to participate in markets and may potentially increase the profits of those already engaged in 
markets. For instance, distance from markets (in terms of time of travel) largely influences both the 
choice and the manner of farmer-market interactions (Fafchamps and Shilpi; 2005). 
With rapid advances in technology, timely and reliable climate seasonal forecasts have become 
more readily available. The information may help farmers to take precautionary actions to palliate the 
negative impacts of adverse climate. Given that climate change is looming large, it is likely that public 
investment in climate forecasting in Africa may generate high economic payoffs (Arndt, Hazell, and 
Robinson, 2000). Meanwhile, it is important to pass on the available information to users.   
Markets may be important for a variety of reasons, including spreading risk and increasing 
incomes. Dercon (2001, p.58) argues that “[m]arkets are means of linking people both spatially and over 
time.” That is, they allow (risks and) shocks to be spread over wider areas. In particular, markets should 
make households less vulnerable to (localized) covariate shocks. For instance, food prices will not 
increase as much in the aftermath of a local drought if traders can import food from other markets. 
Additionally, pre-existing coping strategies (e.g. the sale of productive assets) will be more effective, 
thereby avoiding potentially irreversible effects from their sale.    23
The World Bank’s study “Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth” highlights the importance of 
markets to reducing vulnerability, stating that “[a]mong the low income African countries in the sample, 
high transaction costs and low market access were among the most important constraints on expanding 
agricultural earnings, especially for small farmers and those in remote areas” (p. 5, World Bank, 2005).  
Moreover, improved infrastructure should encourage the formation of non-farm enterprises, 
which as underlined above, is linked with decreased vulnerability. This may be especially important in 
countries with high risk in agriculture (boxes 6-9 of Table 7) as it will provide a source of diversification 
in the short run and, eventually, a transition out of agriculture. Infrastructure may also facilitate migration 
and remittances, which are an important ex ante and ex post mechanism for reducing vulnerability. 
Irrigation and Agricultural Research and Development 
In countries with medium or high levels of agricultural risk (boxes 6-9 of Table 7), irrigation and 
agricultural research and development (R&D) are important options. Irrigation may be particularly 
relevant, due to both its impact on chronic and transitory poverty and the conditions in SSA. Irrigation 
directly reduces poverty and vulnerability by reducing the impact of shocks such as droughts, by 
increasing yields and cropping intensity, and by encouraging farmers to switch towards more marketable 
crops. Indirectly, the labor-intensive nature of irrigation development (e.g. construction and maintenance) 
may increase demand for labor (Hussain and Hanjra, 2004).  
Widespread irrigation, however, is costly and may not be feasible option in many areas. 
Alternatively, agricultural R&D can introduce drought- and disease-resistant crops to help small holders 
and less favored areas where agriculture is important (boxes 4-9 of Table 7) (Hazell and Haddad, 2001), 
and natural resource management practices can improve soil depth and fertility in less favored areas. 
Likewise, increasing yields in the main staple crops can directly benefit small holders, who tend to be 
poor and to consume their own production. Agricultural R&D can also help to alleviate nutritional 
deficiencies, which may lead to vulnerability and nutritional poverty traps. For instance, high vitamin-A 
sweet potatoes are currently being introduced to counteract the particularly high levels of vitamin A 
deficiency in children of East Africa (HarvestPlus, 2005). An estimated 38 and 68 percent of all children 
in Uganda and Mozambique, respectively, are vitamin A deficient, a condition associated with blindness 
in children and a 23 percent increase in child mortality.  
Prices and Agricultural Insurance 
Food price risks are particularly important in areas where food consumption is dominated by one staple, 
such as white maize in Eastern and Southern Africa or millet/sorghum in the Sahelian countries of West 
Africa (Byerlee et al., 2006). Price fluctuations adversely affect households in terms of food insecurity,   24
labor productivity and aggregate growth. Counter-cyclical safety nets may help to reduce price risk as 
well as overall vulnerability. Recently, weather-based insurance has been used recently by the World 
Food Program, which purchased insurance against severe drought in Ethiopia. This may be an option in 
other countries (boxes 4-9 of Table 7) (Lacey, 2006).  But if households are uncertain about aspects of the 
program (i.e. the payoff, timing and selection of recipients), they may simply persist in the same behavior 
and miss out on risky but potentially beneficial opportunities (Alderman and Haque, 2006).  
The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), which is currently being evaluated, provides an 
example of how these types of problems may be overcome. Designed to make intervention more 
predictable from the perspective of chronically or transitorily food insecure households, the PSNP 
guarantees a certain amount of public infrastructure work during the dry season and provides the bulk of 
transfers before the beginning of the “hungry season.” A second component, primarily focused on 
transiently food insecure households, provides payments based upon a rainfall-based index that allows 
payments in a predictable and timely fashion (World Bank, 2006b). These two components should allow 
beneficiaries to engage in riskier but more profitable activities because they are more certain of the timing 
and quantity of benefits they will receive from the program. Moreover, the timing of the program 
increases the likelihood of the transfer arriving before asset depletion (PSNP PPT, 2001). 
Countries with high levels of agricultural exports (typically boxes 2 and 5 of Table 7) will be 
exposed to variations in international prices. As shown in Table 8, variations in prices differ significantly 
across countries and regions. The aggregate effect of price changes can be significant in countries where 
agricultural exports are primarily focused on one or two crops and which rely extensively on agricultural 
exports. For instance, as previously noted, the cotton sector in Mali represents close to half of the 
country’s export revenue and 6 and 9 percent of total tax revenue and GDP, respectively (IMF, 2002). 
The sector directly affects the livelihoods of roughly a third of the population. Consequently, variation in 
international prices will directly affect large segments of the population as well as the government’s 
budget. While the export base can be diversified in a case such as this, commodity exchanges may play a 
useful role in the shorter run. 
Exporters in resource-rich economies (boxes 1, 4, 7 of Table 7) often face over-valued exchange 
rates as a result of exporting their natural resource. In turn, this creates unfavorable terms of trade for 
export sectors, including the agricultural sectors. This can be addressed through a combination of 
investments in the export sector and management of the exchange rate.  
At the sub-national level, the risks and capacity of households may vary dramatically across 
regions. Consequently, the linking of specific investment options with different boxes from the typology 
is only broadly indicative at the country level. Moreover, emerging issues such as climate change may 
alter the underlying risks and shift countries across boxes (as would newly discovered of natural   25
resources). As a result, the various governments need to constantly review and revise their investment 
plans, in order to address emerging and change risks and capacities.    26
Table 8.  Cash crop volatility 
Countries 




























Angola  . . .  0.26  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . 
Benin 0.1%  0.61  0.1%  0.56  0.0%  .  99.4%  0.25 0.3% 0.68 0.1% 0.33 0.0% 0.95  0.25  19 
Botswana  38.7%  .  .  . 0.1% . 3.4%  0.54  56.8%  0.88  0.8%  1.05  0.2%  0.53  0.53  4 
Burkina  Faso  0.1% 0.87 0.1% 0.62 0.4% 0.63  95.0%  0.25 4.4% 0.57 0.0% 0.61 0.1% 0.35  0.26  16 
Burundi  14.4%  .  77.8%  0.33 .  . 0.6% . 2.7% . 4.1%  0.36  0.3%  1.15  0.28  14 
Cameroon  0.0% 1.33  24.7%  0.19  45.0%  0.15  29.3%  0.20 0.5% 0.26 0.0% 1.59 0.3% 1.76  0.18  25 
Central African Republic  0.1%  .  28.9%  0.59  0.2%  0.81 49.8% 0.32 16.9%  .  0.1%  0.03  4.0%  1.02  0.37  9 
Chad  5.5%  . . . . . . .  94.5%  . . . . .  .  . 
Congo  100.0%  . .  0.75  . . . .  0.0%  . . . . .  .  . 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.1%  0.84  10.7%  0.38  78.8%  0.30  8.8% 0.16 1.2% 0.24 0.4% 0.23 0.0% 0.27  0.29  12 
Djibouti  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  . 
DR  Congo  0.0%  . .  0.41  . . . .  100.0%  . . . . .  .  . 
Equatorial  Guinea 100.0%  . . . . . . .  0.0%  . . . . .  .  . 
Eritrea  100.0%  . . . . . . .  0.0%  . . . . .  .  . 
Ethiopia  0.0%  .  93.8%  0.36 0.0%  .  1.8% 0.22 4.1% 0.31 0.3% 0.30 0.0%  .  0.35  10 
Gabon  0.4%  .  3.3%  0.53 20.2% 0.63 15.9%  .  45.7%  .  1.1%  0.25 13.5%  .  0.15 26 
Gambia  91.8%  .  0.4%  .  .  .  2.2% 0.26 5.1% 0.48 0.3% 0.79 0.2% 1.06  0.04  29 
Ghana  0.1% 0.41 0.9% 0.38  98.3%  0.19 0.4% 0.30 0.1% 0.41 0.0% 0.83 0.1% 0.15  0.20  24 
Guinea  0.1% 0.59 57.4% 0.58 16.5% 0.39 24.7% 0.27  0.1%  .  0.8%  0.32  0.4%  0.48  0.47  5 
Guinea-Bissau  100.0%  . . . . . . .  0.0%  . . . . .  .  . 
Kenya  0.0% 0.36  25.4%  0.48 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.54 4.1% 0.15  68.4%  0.16 2.0% 0.57  0.25  20 
Lesotho  0.0%  . . . . . . .  0.0%  . . .  100.0%  0.02  0.02  30 
Liberia  . . .  0.27  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . 
Madagascar 0.8%  .  66.9%  0.45  8.9%  0.27  12.1%  0.24 8.8% 0.33 1.4% 0.35 1.1% 0.52  0.39 8 
Malawi  0.2%  0.44 1.7%  0.45  .  .  1.6%  0.23 11.1% 0.34 11.3% 0.12 74.1%  0.10  0.14 28 
Mali  0.1% 0.39 0.0% 0.00 0.0%  .  99.2%  0.32 0.5% 1.13 0.0% 0.49 0.1% 1.04  0.33  11 
Mauritania  100.0%  . . . . . . .  0.0%  . . . . .  .  . 
Mozambique  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  . 
Namibia  2.0%  0.55  0.3% . 1.0%  0.56  29.4%  0.82  66.5%  0.81  0.4%  0.41  0.4%  0.69  0.80  2 
Niger  19.8% 0.30 0.9%  0.20 23.4%  .  36.5% 0.25  1.8%  0.75 11.8% 0.37  5.8%  0.90  0.26 18 
Nigeria  0.0%  .  0.2% 0.37  93.0%  1.99 5.6% 0.32 0.8% 0.55 0.2% 0.30 0.1% 0.40  1.88 1 
Rwanda 0.0%  .  49.3%  0.49  .  .  0.1%  0.82 0.0%  .  50.5%  0.39 0.0%  .  0.44 7 
Senegal 95.7%  0.22  0.0%  0.49  .  .  0.1%  0.36 1.1% 0.30 0.1% 1.29 3.0% 0.33  0.22  23 
Sierra  Leone  0.0% . 4.7%  . 14.2% . 70.3% .  0.0%  .  1.0%  .  9.8%  .  .  . 
Somalia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  . 
South  Africa  3.9% 0.29 1.4% 0.29 0.0% 0.38 2.8% 0.40  74.9%  0.24 3.9% 0.40  13.0% 0.30  0.26  17 
Sudan  11.6%  .  0.1%  .  .  .  73.9%  0.16  14.3%  0.15 0.0% 0.69 0.0% 0.31  0.14  27 
Swaziland  0.1%  0.33  0.0% . 0.0%  0.61  0.3%  0.27  99.5%  0.59 0.1% 0.32 0.0% 0.89  0.58 3 
Tanzania  2.2% 0.34 33.7% 0.39  2.1%  0.25 22.6% 0.27  1.6%  0.27 12.5% 0.23 25.4% 0.22  0.29 13 
Togo  0.3% 0.54  15.1%  0.44  17.1%  0.30  65.6%  0.21 1.6% 0.49 0.0% 0.65 0.3% 0.15  0.27  15 
Uganda  1.0%  .  68.0%  0.41 0.1% 0.26 2.7% 0.37  11.9%  .  8.2% 0.96 8.1% 1.19  0.46 6 
Zambia  0.2% . 9.2% . 0.0%  0.62  43.8%  0.30  44.6%  0.23  1.0%  0.46  1.1%  0.21  0.24  21 
Zimbabwe  0.0% 0.37 6.3%  0.51  0.0%  0.66 54.3% 0.17 22.9% 0.29  6.4%  0.27 10.0% 0.15  0.22 22 
Based on authors' calculation using FAOSTAT data of averages for the period 1996-2005. Volatility is calculated using the export unit value. 
Volatility is the coefficient of variation. When a category has several components, it is the sum of the volatility of each component weighted by their share in total value of the category. 
Groundnuts are defined as shelled groundnuts, groundnuts with shells and groundnut oil. Sugar is defined as confectionary sugar, raw centrifugal sugar, syrups, etc. Tobacco is un-manufactured tobacco.   27
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper reviews the vulnerability in African countries and discusses the potential role of agricultural 
growth and investment in reducing vulnerability. In order to understand the role of agriculture in the 
broad macro economy context, we further develop a typology based on risk factors, resource endowment 
and geography. The typology does not include political and social instability; instead these factors are 
included in the framework, as they are more framing conditions. However, they are important both as a 
pre-condition for development and policies, and because rural populations may change their livelihoods 
as a result of instability. In turn, this exposes them to new risks. When making big investments in a 
country, governments take risks into account. The recent decline in large-scale civil conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa may present an opportunity for governments to reach populations that were heretofore 
unreachable. However, the effects of conflict may persist across time. Additionally, while large-scale 
conflict has declined, conflict continues to be a substantial issue in areas such as the Central African 
Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan.  
Generally, broad-based interventions or strategies mainly address the covariate shocks and may 
not reach all poor and vulnerable populations. Some households will need assistance to take advantage of 
the new income-generating opportunities resulting from the growth, while others, such as the disabled and 
the elderly, may be unable to participate at all (Barrett et al., 2001; Hoddinott and Quisumbing, 2003). 
Alternately, households may be constrained from participating in the growth due to lack of resources (e.g. 
modern agricultural inputs).  
It should be noted that agricultural growth may not be a silver bullet capable of reaching the 
entire vulnerable population. Complementary risk-reducing and social protection programs may be 
important, particularly in the short run (Chaudhuri, 2003; Farrington et al., 2004; Farrington, 2005). 
Instruments at the micro level, such as food aid and social safety nets (including asset-based safety nets), 
can also play an important supplemental role. The key is to maintain an appropriate balance between 
productive investments geared toward generating long-term growth and social spending aimed at 
buffering short-term risks. While keeping this in mind, this paper primarily focuses on the role of 
agricultural interventions in reducing vulnerability.  
Not all rural groups will benefit from agricultural growth. For instance, agricultural growth driven 
by crop production may increase the vulnerability of pastoralists, while increased utilization of land for 
farming will decrease grazing land. This has already led to social conflict and unrest in several regions of 
SSA. Additional complementary measures, such as linking farmers to pastoralists through the production 
of fodder for animals may be necessary in certain countries.   28
Moreover, effective policies must consider the within-country variation in risk factors, as well as 
agricultural heterogeneity. Disaggregated analyses at the country level can help highlight the specific 
risks and corresponding response mechanisms within countries. Another area for future work is to 
consider how different investments reduce vulnerability within countries. One possible area for future 
research would be to consider the impact of different investments on the expected probability of future 
poverty (a micro measure of vulnerability), in order to see how the benefits of specific investments vary 
across regions and countries. 
Finally, foreign aid itself is a risk factor for the countries receiving such aid. Many SSA countries 
devote precious human resources to meeting the needs of numerous donors, depleting their capacity to 
cope with market and natural risks.     29
APPENDIX:  DATA SOURCES 
LGP summaries were based on 1-km
2 estimates of the length of growing period in days for 2000 
(Thornton, unpublished).  The estimates are based on the on the intersection of mapped boundaries of the 
farming systems (Dixon et al., 2001) with those of national boundaries (FAO, 2006) and gridded 
estimates of rural population density (calculated from the GRUMP data from CIESIN/IFPRI/WB/CIAT, 
2004). Calculations were performed in a raster (gridded environment) derived from the Geographic 
Information System (GIS).  This analysis was performed using a 1-km
2 resolution in a modified Lambert 
Azimuthal Equal Area projection, an equal area projection appropriate for comparison of land areas 
across a large study region.  
LGP, which is defined as the number of days in a year with suitable conditions for plant growth, 
is calculated on the basis of the number of days with minimum temperatures greater than 5 degrees 
Celsius during which precipitation exceeds evapotranspiration by 50%, taking into account the water 
holding capacity of the predominant soil type. This measure provides a broadly relevant measure of 
rainfed agricultural potential.   
Mean rainfall and rainfall variability are from the time-series precipitation data from the 
University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit (Mitchell et al., 2003). These data are interpolated 
globally from weather station records at a 0.5 decimal degree resolution for the period 1951-2005.  For 
the analysis presented here, the ranges of these estimates were grouped as follows. Mean annual rainfall 
(mm) was grouped into 3 classes: low (less than 600 mm), medium (600-1000 mm) and high (greater than 
1000 mm). Rainfall variability was measured as the coefficient of variation of annual rainfall for 1951-
2005, and was grouped into 3 classes: low (less than 18), medium (18-27) and high (greater than 27).   30
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